

European Standardization Organizations



Workshop 'Security in the cyber-physical space'

8 February 2022

Your webinar moderator





Els Somers

Project Manager Policy & Partnerships <u>esomers@cencenelec.eu</u> Get the most out of the webinar today



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Introduction CEN & CENELEC





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European Standardization Organizations









CEN - European Committee for Standardization **CENELEC** - European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization

ETSI - European Telecommunications Standards Institute

→ Recognized by European law (EU Regulation 1025/2012)

Standardization happens at different levels



> Aim: identical standards in Europe and worldwide



CEN and CENELEC deliverables

European Standards (EN)

Prime deliverable

Technical Specifications (TS)

Pre-standard

Technical Reports (TR)

Informative document / Guide

Workshop Agreements (CWA)

Document, developed by a Workshop, which reflects an agreement between identified individuals and organizations responsible for its contents



1	EUROPEAN STANDARD	EN 17483-1
	NORME EUROPÉENNE	
	EUROPÄISCHE NORM	June 2021
	ICS 03.080.99: 13.310	

English Version

Private security services - Protection of critical infrastructure - Part 1: General requirements

Dispositions de sécurité privée pour la protection des infrastructures critiques - Partie 1 : Exigences générales Private Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zum Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen - Teil 1: Allgemeine Anforderungen

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 23 May 2021.

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Today's agenda





Catherine PIANA Director General of CoESS – Confederation of European Security Services Chair of CEN/TC 439 - Private security services

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Discuss if there are physical vulnerabilities arising from IT systems

Likewise, find out if there are cyber vulnerabilities arising from the physical side

▶ If yes, what should we do about them?





- Cybersecurity: the activities necessary to protect network and information systems, the users of such systems and other persons affected by cyber threats.
 - Cybersecurity Act Regulation 2019/881
- CPS Cyber-physical Systems: Engineered systems that orchestrate sensing, computation, control, networking and analytics to <u>interact</u> with the physical world (including humans) and enable safe, real-time, secure, reliable, resilient and adaptable performance.
 - From Newsweek Vantage report "Weathering the Perfect Storm"

Are cyber-physical threats real?





VECTORS OF ATTACK

Which of the following types of security incident has your organization experienced over past 12 months? Select all that apply

Percentage of survey respondents



Cyber-physical: where is the biggest risk?





THE WEAKEST LINKS

Regarding the most serious incident in the past 12 months, please select the options below that most closely describe the source of the vulnerability. Select all that apply.

Percentage of survey respondents



Reality check





FEW FULLY INTEGRATED

Which of the following statements best describes the state of integration between your organization's cyber systems and OT/physical systems?

Percentage of survey respondents

All our OT/physical systems are integrated with externally accessible networks

20

Some of our OT/physical systems are isolated from externally accessible networks, but we are in the process of integrating them with Cyber/IT systems that are externally accessible

> None of our principal OT/physical systems are integrated with externally accessible digital networks



Source: Newsweek Vantage

What is the biggest threat?





ERRANT INSIDERS

Which of the following actors do your consider the biggest threat to your organization's operational security? Select up to two.

Percentage of survey respondents



Your speakers today





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Aviation Ecosystem

- Multiple stakeholders
- Highly interconnecting systems
- Increasing digitalisation
 IoT
 - > AI
 - > Open architecture platform





CPS in aviation

- Merge of cyber and physical worlds
 - Enables remote management
 - Real-time processing
 - > Optimising processes & costs
 - Improving standard levels, service delivery and end user experience (or PAX experience).





Essentials of EU AVSEC Cybersecurity Regulation 2019/1583



New standards introduced: Reg 2019/1583 amending Implementing Reg 2015/1998

- Aligned with: Amendment 16 to ICAO Annex 17 (4.9.1 NEW Standard)
- Subject: revision includes cyber security provisions
- Scope: airports, operators and entities that provide services or goods
- Date of implementation: 31/12/2021

Key challenges

- Progress of harmonizing processes of aviation cybersecurity approach (national/ regional levels);
- Consistency of implementation to avoid creates different dynamics and effectiveness at various operational levels;
- Integration approach of OT/ IT and physical security;
- End-user education. Your system is only as strong as its weakest link and in cybersecurity, the weakest link is very often the end-user.





Responsibility and **liability** concerns;

The way forward - step by step approach



- Mapping and prioritising of critical aviation information and physical systems;
- Implementation of enhanced risk analysis new risk vectors, including insider threats;
- Focus on training and educational processes that stresses the importance of cyber security awareness and measures;
- Strengthening of aviation cyber security culture at all stakeholder levels;
- Continuously update and implement standards and legal framework with authorities and stakeholders including liability issues.
- Launching internal quality control and compliance measures aiming to ensure regulatory consistency, detect gaps and reinforce targeted trainings measures;



Aviation cybersecurity update



Alexis PERIER

Policy Officers European Commission DG MOVE – Directorate-General for Mobility & Transport Directorate A – Policy Coordination Unit A5 - Security

Máté GERGELY





- Regulation 2019/1583 transposed relevant cybersecurity standards in ICAO Annex 17 by amending **Regulation 2015/1998** laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security
- Entry into force: 31 December 2021
- Member States and industry have been preparing for the implementation of the requirements
- ► DG MOVE has provided guidance





"The appropriate authority shall ensure that airport operators, air carriers and entities... identify and protect their critical information and communications technology (ICT) systems and data from cyber attacks which could affect the security of civil aviation."

General requirement on cyber protection as part of aviation security





- Airport operators, air carriers and entities shall identify... the critical ICT systems and data.
- They shall introduce detailed measures to ensure the protection from, detection of, response to and recovery from cyber-attacks.
- ► In accordance with a **risk assessment**.





- Persons having administrator rights or unsupervised and unlimited access to critical ICT systems and data..., or having been otherwise identified in the risk assessment shall be subjected to
- Background checks





- Persons implementing the [cybersecurity] measures shall have the skills and aptitudes required to carry out their designated tasks effectively.
- They shall be made aware of relevant cyber risks on a needto-know basis.

Training + access to information (need-to-know)





- Persons having access to data or systems shall receive appropriate and specific job-related training commensurate with their role and responsibilities, including being made aware of relevant risks where their job function requires this. The appropriate authority... shall specify or approve the content of the course.
- Specific training of key staff with access rights + inform them
- Training to be established or approved by authority



Transport Cybersecurity Toolkit



DG MOVE published a Transport cybersecurity toolkit in all EU languages (available <u>here</u>)

- ► Objective is to contribute to higher levels of cyber-awareness in the transport sector
- ► The toolkit lists practical tips and recommended practices
- ► It is organized in two levels: Basic and Advanced

While not its main focus, the toolkit recommends practices relevant for cyber-physical security:

- ► Locking physically and digitally all systems and devices if unattended
- Considering physical security as an integral part of an organisation's cybersecurity management system
- Implementing access control
- Revoking credentials upon contract termination





EN IEC 62443 Cyber Security Standards for Operational Technology



Judith ROSSEBO

Chairperson CLC/TC 65X 'Industrial-process measurement, control and automation' Co-Convenor CLC/TC65X WG 3 'Cyber Security' judith.rossebo@no.abb.com

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Cyber Attacks Happen!



Poison water supply Destroy industrial Derail city trams **Cause Power outages** processes with injuries = WIRED SECURITY 82.80.2821 86:54 PM WIRED ≡ A Hacker Tried to Poison a Florida \equiv WIRED Software | Internet | Security | Government | Social Networking | Mobile Pho City's Water Supply, Officials Say CHUCK SQUATRIGLIA GEAR 01.11.2000 01:29 PM Home > News > Security ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 06.12.2017 08:00 AM Polish Teen Hacks His City's Security experts confirm Ukraine power grid blackout a 'coordinated intentional attack' Trams, Chaos Ensues 'Crash Override': The by Jason Murdock 11 Jan 2016 Malware That Took Down a Power Grid Detailed analysis by cyber experts at SANS Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has confirmed that the outage at a Ukrainian power grid was a "coordinated intentional attack" "After analysing the information that has been made available by affected power companies OTIL researchers and the media it is clear that cyber attacks were directly responsible for power outages in Ukraine " said Michael Assante director of SANS ICS. Sources:

https://www.wired.com/2008/01/polish-teen-hac/ https://www.wired.com/story/crash-override-malware/ https://www.wired.com/story/oldsmar-florida-water-utility-hack/

EN IEC 62443 Cyber Security Standards for Operational Technology



- Systematic approach
- Risk based
- Applied across a wide range of sectors
 - Utility grids and systems
 - ► Hydropower facilities
 - ► Offshore wind
 - ► Railway, shipping and aviation
 - Building control
 - Industrial automation and IIoT



Photo: https://etech.iec.ch/issue/2020-04/iec-62443-standards-a-cornerstone-of-industrial-cyber-security



62443 is a <u>series</u> of standards being developed by <u>two</u> <u>groups</u>:

- ► ISA99 → ISA-62443
- ► IEC TC65/WG10 \rightarrow IEC 62443 \rightarrow EN IEC 62443 (CLC/TC65X)
- ► In consultation with:

► ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 → ISO/IEC 2700x → EN ISO/IEC 2700x (JTC13)



IEC 62443 horizontal standards for OT

- -1-1 Terminology, concepts and models
- -2-1 Establishing and IACS security program
- -2-4 Security program requirements for service providers
- -3-2 Security risk assessment for system design
- -3-3 System security requirements and security levels
- -4-1 Secure product development lifecycle requirements
- -4-2 Technical security requirements for IACS component: 11C 62351





Thanks for listening!





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European Standardization Organizations

Thank you for your participation!

Next webinars

- 2022-02-28 Workshop 'Standardisation synergies between civil security, defence and space industries'
- 2022-03-15 Cybersecurity Standardisation Conference 2022 (cooperation between ENISA, ETSI, CEN & CENELEC)
- 2022-04-21 Workshop 'Interoperability of security'